setting out details of the plans for next year agreed between the DHSS and the regional health authorities': an annual process linked to the system performance reviews that started in 1983.' Under this system DHSS ministers meet the regional chairmen annually to discuss and agree action plans; in turn, the regional chairmen then are expected to carry out a similar exercise with their district health authorities. The targets agreed between the DHSS and the regions do not therefore necessarily represent a departmental diktat, but are the product of a process of negotiation. In effect, the DHSS responds to, modifies, and sometimes imposes its own priorities on the plans put forward by the regions.
misleading conclusions it also reflected the emergence of a more directive and interventionist style of management in the NHS. It is not a style that Mr Paige and his board have created. On the contrary, the appointment of Mr Paige and his board simply represents the last, logical step in a process that is gradually transforming the style of management in the NHS and the relationship between the DHSS and the health authorities: a process crystallised but not caused by the Griffiths report.' And it is a transformation that has profound long term implications for the way in which health care policies are defined and implemented, and perhaps also for the structure of the NHS. Mr Paige's startlingly precise prediction of the number of maternity cases in the Trent region provides a good starting point to explore these implications. The source for the news about Mr Paige's decision was a DHSS press handout setting out details of the plans for next year agreed between the DHSS and the regional health authorities': an annual process linked to the system performance reviews that started in 1983.' Under this system DHSS ministers meet the regional chairmen annually to discuss and agree action plans; in turn, the regional chairmen then are expected to carry out a similar exercise with their district health authorities. The targets agreed between the DHSS and the regions do not therefore necessarily represent a departmental diktat, but are the product of a process of negotiation. In effect, the DHSS responds to, modifies, and sometimes imposes its own priorities on the plans put forward by the regions.
The plans are the product of negotiation and bargaining. But it is clear that the two partners do not bargain on equal terms. The regions may propose but it is the DHSS that disposes. This emerges clearly from the manpower targets announced by Mr Paige: in other words, the inputs into the NHS. This concern with inputs as distinct from outputs-that is, the resources going into the services as distinct from the number of patients treated, etc, coming out of it-is longstanding. For example, control over consultant posts has been one of the Department's most effective instruments for achieving a better distribution of resources, both geographically and between specialties, almost since the start of the NHS.
The latest round of manpower targets shows that the Department's long term concern with inputs is undiminished by its more recent interest in outputs. And, in this instance, it is the DHSS's decision that is final. Thus, five regions will have to settle for fewer staff than they asked for. The DHSS's insistence on determining the precise number of people to be employed in each region, and the delivery of services in the NHS as a result of reductions in the planned level of expenditure growth and so called "efficiency savings." Challenged to explain the effects of these policy changes on the availability of care to patients, DHSS witnesses floundered. The development of a system for setting specific output objectives, and monitoring progress towards them, can thus be seen as a way of relating the inputs of resources into the NHS (money) and the production of outputs (services).
Management vocabulary becoming universal
The transformation of the administrative style in the NHS also reflects, however, a more general change that has affected government departments and public services. Economic scarcity has made the vocabulary of management the universal language of Whitehall. The manifesto of this new philosophy of government can be found in the 1982 report on efficiency and effectiveness in the Civil Service. This emphasised that it should be the responsibility of all departments to promote "an organisation and system in which managers at all levels have: (a) a clear view of their objectives and means to assess and, wherever possible, measure outputs or performance in relation to these objectives; (b) well defined responsibility for making the best use of their resources including a critical scrutiny of output and value for money."
This kind of system is essential, a subsequent white paper argued, not only to increase efficiency but to create an effective system of accountability: "Managers need to know how much they may spend; why they should spend it; and how their expenditure and results through the year compare with the plan. While the centre of the department receives regular information about the use of resources and the effectiveness of activities individual managers can then be held accountable for their performance."'
The implications of this new style of government for the structure of management in the NHS are profound and range far beyond the immediate impact of the Griffiths report. Firstly, they promise, in the long term at any rate, to make a reality of what has, until now, been the semifiction of ministerial accountability to parliament. For the theory of parliamentary accountability-that is, the doctrine that ministers are answerable to the House of Commons for everything that happens in the NHS because the service is financed out of public money-has been undermined in practice by the ignorance of ministers about what is happening at the coal face. Secondly, the changes will also make it possible to debate in detail what the NHS should be trying to do. Until now policy debates in parliament have been largely about the broad priorities that should be pursued. But once explicit service objectives start to be s.et it becomes possible to debate the detailed aims of the NHS. In other words, changes in the system of management in the NHS may eventually lead to changes in the system of political control by creating an opportunity for a national debate about precisely what the service should be doing.
The development of a system for defining objectives at the national level, and for assessing performance at the operational level, promises to bring about the most important transformation in the history of the NHS. Since 1948 the services delivered have reflected as much the idiosyncratic and divergent priorities of local clinicians and health authorities as explicit central government policies. Now there is the prospect of an NHS that actually lives up to its name-that is, a national service whose local patterns of provision and activity reflect national policies, not only about inputs but also about outputs. But before celebrating the final apotheosis of the 1948 vision, ironically achieved through the management philosophy of a Conservative government, it is important also to take into account some of the problems that this is 1677 likely to bring about if the logic of the present, still tentative approach to setting output objectives is pursued with consistency and rigour.
Equating increased activity and effectiveness Firstly, there is the problem of how the objectives of the NHS should be defined. What should be the language of objectives? In the 'seventies the language of objectives was that of service inputs. The priority documents published by the Labour government set the objectives of the NHS in terms of the balance of resources that should be devoted to various client groups, and set specific manpower and other targets for service inputs.9'0 Now, as Mr Paige's press release and the evidence of the performance review show, the language of objectives is changing. It Secondly, there is the prohlctem ti.t thi more specliL the objectives of the NHS become the greater will be the pressures to concentrate resources on those services that have a high degree of political, emotional, and media visibility. Output objectives are most easy to define and set in those service areas where specific procedures are being carried out. And, compounding this methodological bias, output objectives are most likely to attract public attention if they include procedures designed to deal with life threatening conditions, such as open heart operations. Thus, a system of output objectives could tilt the balance of NHS activities towards these forms of activity that lend themselves most easily to professional and political dramatisation, as distinct from those services concerned with quality of care or enhancing the quality of life. Such a bias is not inevitable. In the case of the performance reviews, quoted above, some of the objectives are being set in terms of the kind of services deemed desirable for the chronically ill. Equally, it is possible to set output targets for the number of hip operations or cataracts dealt with. But if this kind of balance is to be achieved it will mean explicitly taking into account the political and professional pressures pulling in the opposite direction.
Thirdly, there is the problem of whether a system of nationally agreed objectives, with strict and detailed accountability for performances to central government and parliament, could be compatible with the present structure and status of health authorities. The role of health authorities and their members has always been ambiguous. ' physical illness or physical disability to the extent that the patient is confined to the home or unable to leave it alone; (d) a serious physical illness; (e) confinement to bed or inability to walk unaided within the house coupled with the requirement for heating day and night.
" (5) In relation to attendance needs: (a) a need for frequent attention in connection with bodily functions; (b) a need for continual supervision in order to avoid substantial danger to himself or others.
" (6) In relation to baths-persons who on medical grounds need more than one bath a week.
" (7) In relation to diet-persons who need a special diet because of (a) diabetes, peptic ulcer, conditions of the throat causing serious difficulty in swallowing, ulcerative colitis, tuberculosis needing treatment with drugs, or similar illnesses; (b) convalescence from a major illness or operation or suffering from an illness involving a diet costing more than the normal diet; (c) renal failure for which the patient is being treated by dialysis.
" (8) In relation to claims for extra laundry: (a) where the laundry cannot be done at home because all adult members of the household are ill, disabled, or infirm; (b) where the quantity of laundry is substantially greater because of a patient's incontinence.
" (9) In relation to claims for wear and tear on clothing-where a person suffers from a physical or mental condition, which causes clothing or footwear to wear out unusually quickly."
Central accountability-continuedfrom page 1677 opportunity than your predecessors to plan and develop services in the light of local needs and circumstances." '3 Future for health authority members
The degree of discretion exercised by individual health authorities and their emphasis or not on local priorities has been a reflection largely of the absence or fuzziness of objectives and criteria of performance. Under the emerging new system health authorities may still be partners in the policy creation process, to the extent that they engage in a dialogue with the DHSS about objectives and performance. But once these have been set health authorities become executors of nationally agreed policy: in effect, part of the hierarchy of line management.
This leaves health authorities caught trying to reconcile two different roles. How can they best combine representing local interests and acting as line managers? In the formulation of plans they need to act in the former capacity; in the execution ofplans they need to act in the latter capacity. This tension always has been present in the NHS, but it is being accentuated by the developing system of output targets. And the ultimate logic of this system would be for health authorities to become smaller, more managerial bodies whose action plans combined local and national policy aims, while the role of local advocacy would be left to community health councils. The councils were created originally for precisely this purpose'4 and their responsibilities have recently been extended to cover the work of family practitioner committees. " Our analysis would suggest that the way in which the objectives and performance of the NHS are conceptualised moulds, in turn, the organisational structure of the service and the relationship between central government and health authorities. In the decades when the only concern of governments was with defining objectives and performance in terms of inputs much discretion was left to individual health authorities in theory and to professional health providers in practice. We are moving into a second stage, where the concern of central government with outputs-as part of its larger preoccupation with increasing productivity and value for moneyis leading it inexorably to setting local managerial tasks and limiting local professional discretion. And the question now is whether it is possible to move towards a third stage, in which the objectives and performance of the NHS are defined in terms of outcomes, so leaving individual health authorities free to decide on the best means in the light of local circumstances while ensuring that the government can hold them to account for achieving agreed, explicit, and measurable aims. Certainly, unless it proves possible to move towards outcomes, it is difficult to see how the present, rightful emphasis on strengthening accountability can be achieved without also imposing an undesirable degree of rigidity on the NHS.
